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ARGUMENT 
I. A VALID COURT ORDER EXISTS THAT DETERMINES 
PETITIONER'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
Petitioner's Divorce Decree ordering her former spouse to 
pay child support should be construed as simultaneously ordering 
Petitioner not to pay child support. Silence in the decree as t< 
her support obligation is an affirmative determination that she 
is under no court order to pay child support. The Petitioner anc 
her former husband are entitled to rely on the finality of the 
child support order in determining th4 right to receive and the 
duty to pay. The Divorce Decree did not order Petitioner to pay 
child support to Mr. Hutchinson, but did order him to pay child 
support to her. In so allocating the child support obligation on 
Mr. Hutchinson, the Divorce Decree is a court order as to Peti-
tioner's support obligation within the meaning of the Public 
Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-l through 24. 
The Respondent's claim that no court order exists as to 
Petitioner's support obligation is both unpersuasive and contrary 
to legal authority. It is the law in this state that a court 
order includes any judgment or order of any district court of 
this state ordering payment of a set or determinable amount of 
support money, Utah Code Ann. §7S-45b-2(3) The Petitioner's 
Divorce Decree is such a court order that allocates and deter-
mines the rights and obligations of the parties to that divorce 
proceeding. Silence as to Petitioner's support obligation does 
not invalidate the fact that a court order exists as to her 
support duty, nor does it suggest that Petitioner's obligation to 
her children was not an issue properly addressed by the court. 
Since the Divorce Decreefs treatment of the parties1 child 
support obligation is a court order for purposes of the Public 
Support of Children Act, it may not be disturbed without follow-
ing the proper procedures provided for by law. The District 
Court retains continuing jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding 
under Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5, which provides that the court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for the support and maintenance of the parties, and the custody 
and support of the children. Thus the court, and not an adminis-
trative agency, has the power to modify a divorce decree* 
The Petitioner simply claims that the Department of Social 
Services (the Department), must comply with rules governing civi 
procedure. She does not claim that she may never be required to 
provide additional support for her children. She only claims 
that the duty of support must be modified in a judicial, and not 
an administrative proceeding. The Department must follow the 
proper procedure and petition the District Court for a 
modification of the existing court order if circumstances justi 
a change. The Department's administrative modification of 
Petitioner's Divorce Decree was both improper and unlawful. 
II. PETITIONER'S DIVORCE DECREE IS RES JUDICATA 
A divorce decree, like other final judgments, is conclusi1 
as to the parties and their privies and operates as a bar to a 
subsequent action, Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 
1978). The doctrine of res judicata precludes the relitigatic 
of all issues that could have been litigated, as well as those 
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that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action, Bernard v. 
Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981). 
The language of the Divorce Decree clearly allocates the 
support obligation to Mr. Hutchinson. In so allocating the dut? 
of support, the court purposely and deliberately determined that 
Petitioner would not pay child support under the terms of the 
Divorce Decree. The court is not obligated to state, "Plaintiff 
is awarded custody of the children and Defendant is not awarded 
custody of the children; Plaintiff is ordered to pay child 
support and Defendant is not ordered to pay child support." The 
issue of child support was specifically addressed by the court ii 
the parties1 divorce decree. 
The Respondent claims that the issue of child support may be 
redetermined by the Department because the Department was not 
privy to the Petitioner's divorce action. The Department is not 
a "real party in interest" (as the Respondent asserts), but is in 
privity with Mr. Hutchinson. The Department's rights are deriva-
tive and no greater than the rights of Mr. Hutchinson, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45b-3; Karren v. Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986). The Department obviously was 
not a party at the time of the parties' Divorce Decree because it 
had no interest in the support question at that time. The 
Department is now barred from raising the issue of a support 
obligation since the issue has been addressed in the parties1 
Divorce Decree. A court order exists afe to Petitioner's support 
obligation, and the issue is res judicata. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Department of 
Social Services Administrative Court should be reversed and 
Petitioner should be held harmless from a child support obliga-
tion owed to the Department for the time^period in question. 
DATED t h i s (vTft day of f\7) /QAJ/ , 1987. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
BY: LOUISA L. BAKER 
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